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Abstract
The goal of this study is to investigate a behavior-rule based
technique for detecting the malicious behavior of the sensors
and actuators embedded in medical devices such as Vital Sign
Monitor (VSM), Patient Analgesic Control (PCA), Cardiac
Device (CD), and Continuous Glaucous Monitor (CGM). First,
a set of behavior rules for both malicious and normal behaviors
are proposed. Second, a transformation methodology has been
used to transfer the proposed set of behavior rules into a state
machine. Finally, a Finite State Machine (FSM) has been built
using Altera ModelSim and Quartus II toolset. The simulation
and synthesis results using a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) demonstrate that our FSM hardware model can
effectively identify malicious behavior from normal behavior.
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Introduction
The proposed study uses sensors as well as actuator readings
and settings to build a Behavior Monitoring Tool (BMT) that
uses the notion of behavior rules to specify acceptable
behaviors of sensors and actuators embedded in certain
medical devices such as VSM, PCA, CD, and CGM. Tables 1
and 2 show a sample of both normal behavior status rules and
malicious behavior status rules [1],[2], respectively.
States in State Machine Terminology
Each device functions in different modes of operation, also
known as states (see Figure 1). Table 3 shows different states of
a system.
.
Simulation and Synthesis
Using Altera ModelSim and Quartus II toolset, we
implemented four Finite State Machines (FSM) for PCA,
CD, VSM, and CGM, respectively. The resulting Register
Transfer Level (RTL) views are shown in Figures 2, 3, 4 and
5, respectively. We ran a functional simulation within a range
of different acceptable parameters of the state components.
These ranges of values reflect the physiology and responses
of patient treatment for each device. The waveform
simulation results for PCA, CD, VSM, and CGM are shown
in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively. Furthermore, device
utilization and power analysis summaries for the PCA and
CD devices are shown in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
Detecting Malicious Behavior for the Sensors and Actuators Embedded in 
Medical Devices: A Hardware Approach
Description Safe State Trustee Monitor
Pulse above threshold during analgesic 
request
(Analgesic Request = TRUE) ᴧ (Pulse > Ts) PCA VSM
Pulse matches pacemaker frequency Pulse = Pacemaker frequency CD VSM
Trustee blood pressure matches monitor Trustee blood pressure = Monitor blood 
pressure
VSM Peer VSM
Trustee Glucose matches monitor Monitor Glucose = Trustee Glucose CGM Peer CGM
TABLE 1. NORMAL BEHAVIOR STATUS RULES IN CONJUNCTION NORMAL FORM (CNF)
Device Malicious State Device attributes
PCA Analgesic Request Rate > T Analgesic request
CD (Mode =PACEMAKER) ᴧ (ǀ Pulse -Pacemaker Frequency ǀ) > ᵟ CD  mode ,pulse
VSM ǀ Monitor Oxygen Saturation - Trustee Oxygen Saturation ǀ > ᵟ Oxygen Saturation
CGM (Insulin Request = TRUE) ᴧ (Pulse < T) ᴧ (Glucose < T) Insulin Request rate, pulse, 
Glucose
TABLE 2. MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR STATUS RULES IN CNF
Status Cause Output Alarm
Safe The device is working correctly as specified by the behavior rules. 00
Unsafe The device is seen to deviate from normal behavior specified by the 
behavior rules.
11
Warning The values exceed the warning threshold for at least one behavior 
rule
10
Idle Initial State of the system 01
TABLE 3. DEVICE STATUS
An RTL circuit for the PCA device’s FSM  module is shown in Figure. 2.
1. PCA
Figure 2. An RTL view of the  PCA device’s Behavior Specification Rules Tool  (BSRT) along with the simulation waveforms
Figure 3. An RTL view for the CD device ‘s Behavior Specification Rules Tool  along with the simulation waveforms
2. CD
An RTL circuit for the CD device’s FSM module is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 4. An RTL view for the VSM  Behavior Specification Rules Tool along with the simulation waveforms
3. VSM
An RTL circuit for the VSM device’s FSM module is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 5. An RTL view for the CGM Behavior Specification Rules Tool along with the simulation waveforms
4. CGM
An RTL circuit for the CGM device’s FSM module is shown in Figure 5.
Figure. 1. State Transition Diagram
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone III
Device EP3C120F780C7
Timing Models Final
Total logic elements 57 / 119,088 (< 1 %)
Total combinational functions 57 / 119,088 (< 1 %)
Dedicated logic registers 4 / 119,088 (< 1 %)
Total registers 4
Total pins 32 / 532 (6 %)
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone III
Device EP3C120F780C7
Power Models Final
Total Thermal Power Dissipation 120.48 mW
Core Dynamic Thermal Power Dissipation 1.64 mW
Core Static Thermal Power Dissipation 99.06 mW
I/O Thermal Power Dissipation 19.77 mW
TABLE 4. UTILIZATION SUMMARY OF THE PCA BSRM TOOL TABLE 5. POWER ANALYSIS SUMMARY OF THE PCA BSRM TOOL
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone IV GX
Device EP4CGX150DF31I7
Timing Models Final
Total logic elements 54 / 149,760 ( < 1 % )
Total combinational functions 54 / 149,760 ( < 1 % )
Dedicated logic registers 4 / 149,760 ( < 1 % )
Total registers 4
Total pins 36 / 508 ( 7 % )
TABLE 6. UTILIZATION SUMMARY OF THE CD BSRM TOOL
Attribute Criteria
Family Cyclone IV GX
Device EP4CGX150DF31I7
Power Models Final
Total Thermal Power Dissipation 141.18 mW
Core Dynamic Thermal Power Dissipation 2.14 mW
Core Static Thermal Power Dissipation 118.71 mW
I/O Thermal Power Dissipation 20.33 mW
TABLE 7. POWER ANALYSIS SUMMARY OF THE CD BSRM TOOL
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Conclusion
This study determined the effect of using a hardware approach to detect malicious behavior in sensors and
actuators that are embedded in medical devices. The experimental results confirmed that the specification
behavior rules can be utilized to build a hardware monitoring tool that can identify the expected normal
behavior of a device and detect any deviation from its normal behavior. Furthermore, we showed through our
analysis that our model is consistent with two dominant design requirements for next-generation high-end
applications; lower power consumption and higher bandwidth. The reconfigurable nature of FPGA allows to
modify and update the whole design according to the set of behavior rules, which outperform software based
approaches that are difficult to update. In addition, hardware approaches are difficult to be hacked. One of the
most significant findings to emerge from this study is that a hardware based specification rules approach can
be used to identify malicious behavior.
